Bryant, in explaining what holds together the real but non-existent speculative realist movement he argues:
In short, all of the SR positions share the thesis that the human and human phenomena have no special place within being and are opposed to the thesis that we must start with an analysis of something pertaining to the human (mind, history, language, power, signs, etc.) to properly pose questions of ontology.
It seems to me this rejection of anthropocentrism is also the starting point for critical animal studies (And I should add I find Bryant's formulation elegant. Philosophy can always use more elegant formulations.), even if (most) CAS heads in some very different directions than (most) SR after this rejection of anthropocentric ontology. I think one of the ways to understand this difference is by examining another common opposition that Bryant posits for SR:
On the other hand, I think all of those in the speculative realist camp are deeply exhausted by styles of philosophy that begin from the standpoint of critique (in the Kantian sense), the phenomenological analysis of experience, hermeneutics, and textual analysis. There’s a sense that these approaches to philosophy, as powerful and valuable as they are, have exhausted their possibilities and are standing in the way of engaging with the sorts of questions demanded by our contemporary moment. For example, its difficult to imagine something less relevant than phenomenology, hermeneutics, semiotics, or deconstructive textual analysis to the sorts of issues posed by the ecological crisis. Ecology just requires a very different set of conceptual tools. Moreover, we are living in the midst of one of the most remarkable periods in scientific and mathematical development and invention, yet we have a group of philosophers continuing to pretend that the Greeks said it all and that philosophy largely ended at the beginning of the 19th century. It is also simply bizarre to think that these developments are adequately thematized through the resources of textual analysis or semiotics. We need to become a bit more pre-critical again, I think, to adequately discuss these sorts of issues.
I am, in many ways, very sympathetic to this argument. In many ways also in strong agreement (this odd obsession with Greek as origin, and origin as the authentic and true seems relatively useless to me). But if we replace ecology with the systematic exploitation of animals (and of course, recognizing that the exploitation there is deeply implicated in the present ecological crisis), I doubt highly that "phenomenology, hermeneutics, semiotics, or deconstructive textual analysis" have exhausted themselves in changing the status of the animal. Not only have phenomenological moments with nonhuman animals been crucial for many people changing their views regarding animal exploitation, but it seems that humanism and speciesism are strongly powerful in maintaining the systematic exploitation of animals. If we are to change things, I feel that confronting how this humanism and speciesism is maintained from their roots to their present formulation is a necessary move, which means critique is a necessary tool for CAS. This critical element needs to be centered not just on political and philosophical texts, but also on present media and scientific texts. At the same time, I agree we need to pay more attention to some of the present movements in current scientific discourses. Indeed, CAS is also interesting as a philosophical movement because of its strong interest in things like current evolutionary discourses, primatology, cognitive ethology, etc. (And indeed, one of the few major continental philosophers that seemed to be particularly interested in these things was Derrida).
I should have a conclusion here, I know. But I don't, not really. I don't think my argument is against SR, and I don't think SR invalidates CAS. I am merely trying to create a dialogue with another intellectual movement that begins with a similar anti-anthropocentric position.
12 comments:
I agree that phenomenology et al "have not exhausted themselves" yet with respect to animals or eco-social relations. SR seems to me a particular, local and temporary constellation. Another potential constellation could be something like an etho-onto-semiotics, or an onto-phenomenalism (Michael Zimmerman's term, I believe, which didn't really get picked up), or other variants that could draw in the strands of Deleuzian materialism with CAS, post-ANT, SR, et al. The question is not only which term, and which set of alliances, will stick (resulting in a few publications and conferences) but which will generate broader productive engagements outside academe. CAS now has its journals, conferences (at least irregular ones?), and widening alliances (with feminism, technoscience studies, ecocriticism, 'animal geographies' and 'animal sociologies/anthropologies', et al.). I would like to see more self-reflection on our positioning within academic as well as societal movements, so this discussion is very heartening.
another thought...
Latour's efforts to develop a 'cosmopolitical' movement are very important, and a great case study. (See his edited volumes 'Iconoclash' and 'Atmospheres of Democracy'.) I don't know if Harman looks at Latour's own activist work (this kind of alliance building) in context of his philosophy, but the two go hand in hand.
Rather reactionary article on the front page of last Thursday's Washington Post by Rob Stein, "That Hangdog Look Might Not Be What You Think: People may be projecting human emotions on their pooches, study finds" - referring to psychologist Alexandra Horowitz at Barnard College in NY, and her July BEHAVIOURAL PROCESSES article. She had pet owners put a tempting treat next to their dog, issue an injuction not to eat it, and then leave the room. Horowitz would then either encourage the dog to eat it or remove it. Horowitz considered the latter an instance of obediance! Then she would lie, or not, to the owner and watch the dog's reaction when it was scolded or praised. Her conclusion? The dogs didn't feel real guilt, like humans would. And what does she assume real human guilt is based on, a knowledge of truth and falsity rather than submissive reactions to social critique? Her target? Pervasive anthropomorphism, even among scientists, where affective reactions among animals are considered comparable to those among humans. UGH! Long way to go - keep up the good work (Mark Crosby, no ID recognizable by Blogger ;)
Adrian,
I agree that the question of alliances is a very useful one. Or to put it in terms that I understand slightly better, a question of coalitions. One of the interesting things about some CAS conferences is that several of the people at those conferences are not professional academics, many of them are activists. For me, philosophy has to be intensive for it to be worthwhile. Part of that intensity is its ability to produce coalitions, alliances, packs. The best philosophy is not written for an already existent audience, but rather summons forth a new audience. Or, as D&G might put it, summons forth a new people and a new earth.
To put it another way, I absolutely agree with the need to produce new positive philosophies (when I talk about a becoming-vegetarian/becoming-vegan, or when I write about reconceptualizing rights based on animal rights, I am obviously trying to do just that), but I think you don't stand much chance of success (in some, if not all cases) unless such a philosophy contains a critical element that allows for such a stuttering new philosophy to be heard.
Mark Crosby (sorry blogger won't recognize your ID, you don't have a blog or anything I should be linked to, do you?), that story is both sad and still far too common. Anthropomorphism is not the worse sin one could have.
It also seems to me that people develop affective communication with animals all the time. I am far more interested in trying to figure out such models than I am in another attempt for people to tell us their opinions about animal reactions are more valid than ours.
Thanks for your comment!
From what I've read, the study's methodology was anything but impressive: tiny sample, not double-blind, fails to consider alternative explanations, etc. If not for the fact that the author is a professor, I would have thought the study came from a final year psychology project. Her "lab" site is here.
Great post, Scu. If I get some time between proofing drafts of student essays tomorrow, I'll write more on it over at Larval Subjects. I'd like to emphasize, however, that for me the aim is not to reject things like hermeneutics, deconstruction, semiotics, and the rest, but to put them in their proper place. The point is not that these approaches are mistaken, but that they become impediments when analysis is restricted to these forms of critique. Latour is really good on these points in We Have Never Been Modern. He talks about the need for a hybrid form of analysis, like Frankenstein, that simultaneously is realist, semiotic, deconstructive, etc.
Thanks Levi.
I've not read a lot of Latour. Somehow, in the hordes of philosophy I have read, he has mostly been left out. But I have read his article, "Has Critique Run Out of Steam?" several times now. Even taught it to some undergraduate policy debaters. One of my favorite parts goes as follows: "My argument is that a certain form of critical spirit has sent us down the wrong path, encouraging us to fight the wrong enemies and, worst of all, to be considered as friends by the wrong sort of allies because of a little mistake in the definition of its main target. The question was never to get away from facts but closer to them, not fighting empiricism but, on the contrary, renewing empiricism."
So, I think I understand where you are getting too, as well. I think a certain critical spirit has stopped you (and others) from being able to pose certain philosophical questions and answers. For me, a certain philosophical and scientific anthropology has kept certain questions from being asked. From being taken seriously, and from allowing serious answers to these questions to be considered doing philosophy at all. In that sense, these critical tools have been essential and necessary for me to be able to do philosophy. But I also agree that a certain critical spirit often stops philosophy from being done.
Regardless, I do hope you find time to make some over at your blog. Proofing student papers over the summer, ouch.
Critical Animal, quoting Levi: "In short, all of the SR positions share the thesis that the human and human phenomena have no special place within being and are opposed to the thesis that we must start with an analysis of something pertaining to the human"
Kvond: The funny thing is that this distinctly does not describe Graham Harman's thinking at all. In fact Harman starts specifically at Husserl, and his entire extension of Phenomenology is a projection of distinctly human-oriented descriptions and category, rather fancifully, INTO objects. Try as he might to wriggle himself free from this Husserlian origin, once he has begun here, he is within a human-centric view, no matter what name he gives his philosophy. A simple reading of his theory of causation "Vicarious Causation" will show what I am speaking about. Just keep track of HOW he talks about the inner realm of objects, and realize just how human-centered it is. Supposedly bowling balls and electrons and election results all have representation "sensuous vicars" of other objects within them, alluring them into causation. One could not make a more human-projection if one wanted to.
It is my belief that Phenomenology simply is the wrong place to start, if one wants to reject the notion that humans are the starting point.
If we are to begin/continue a critical animal studies it hs to orient itself against a distinctly human, representationalist view of valued cognition. Semiotics indeed does go quite a bit in this direction, thankfully, departing from the Idealist/Phenomenological, ultimately Cartesian branch of the tree.
Just my thoughts on the matter.
Kvond, thanks for the comment. I have no clue about Harman, because I still haven't gotten around to reading any of his books (though Prince of Networks is on my list). I certainly don't doubt his intention to develop a non-anthropocentric ontology.
As far as phenomenology goes, I am far from any sort of expert. It is not the point from which my work proceeds. However, I have found Merleau-Ponty's concept of flesh to be of great use, and in general his later works seems to have escape many of pitfalls (though not all) of cartesian metaphysics.
"If we are to begin/continue a critical animal studies it hs to orient itself against a distinctly human, representationalist view of valued cognition."
I'd certainly agree with that statement.
Scu,
You may enjoy M.Ponty, but you have to return to Husserl (and Heidegger) if you want to enter into Harman land.
If you want a nice short cut into Harman's treatment of non-human objects, I suggest his "On Vicarious Causation". (I can email you a copy if you like, kvdi@earthlink.net .) One gets the full, unwieldy nature of his imported human-oriented concepts.
I do not doubt that Harman in many ways wants to create a non-anthropocentric philosophy, but he is, in my view, working from human-oriented cloth.
Here is a diagram I made so as to be sure that I understood what Harman was trying to say. Harman, before deleting his blog, agreed that it presents his concepts accurately, and linked to it from his then-blog.
http://kvond.wordpress.com/2009/02/15/vicarious-causation-diagrammed/
Why Levi thinks that bowling balls and election results having vicarious vicar sensuous objects within them is NOT some sort of human-centered thinking (projection), I really unsure.
I'll try to check out the diagram later.
I'm always down for some good Heidegger bashing.
Husserl is, in many ways, far better. Definitely more interesting for me. However, I agree that he doesn't break free of anthropocentrism that I have ever seen (but, I certainly don't know Husserl at the level of any of any of these other theorists).
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